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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this article is to describe, interpret and critically analyse the political 
and managerial processes which the newly constituted Cape Town Municipality 
(CTM) followed in initiating and implementing its performance management 
approach from 1996-2000.  The following research questions were posed: 
(i) How clearly were the political-administrative vision and values of the 
CTM formulated and developed? 
(ii) How was achievement of strategic performance objectives facilitated 
through management effectiveness and efficiency? 
(iii) How effectively was a normative framework of international best practice 
implemented by the CTM? 
(iv) What was the impact of political and union attitudes and actions on 
performance management principles and practice? 
(v) What issues of co-ordination and co-operation were evident in the 
process? 
JEL J50 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The notion of Performance Management (PM) is a relatively new one in South 
Africa, especially in the public sector.  It developed internationally in the past 30 
years from its origin in the Management by Objectives (MBO) approach first 
enunciated by management writers such as Drucker (1954), Odiorne (1965) and 
Reddin (1970).  In the past decade, MBO has evolved into a more holistic, 
participative managerial approach, now generally known as ‘ Performance 
Management’. Performance Management has its roots in the private sector. In 
recent years attempts have been made to transplant it to the public sector, albeit 
with mixed success (Hughes, 1998: 181-7). 
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The aim of this article is to describe, interpret and critically analyse the political 
and managerial processes which the newly constituted CTM followed in 
initiating and implementing its performance management approach from 1996-
2000. 
 
 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT – DEFINITIONS 
 
Armstrong (1994: 23) defines performance management as a method of 
establishing shared understanding about what is to be achieved, and an approach 
to managing and developing people in a way that increases the probability that 
defined outputs will be achieved in both the short and longer terms. 
 
The overall goal of performance management is to establish an organisational 
culture in which individuals and teams take responsibility for the continuous 
improvement of the organisation, and of their own skills and contributions to 
desired results. 
 
Williams (1991: 7) states that: 
 
‘The setting of objectives and measurements is the performance 
management activity which ensures that all employees know what results 
they need to achieve, to maximise their contribution to the overall 
business plan.  In essence it enables employees to know what is required 
of them and on what basis their performance contribution will be 
assessed.’ 
 
Williams also emphasises (1991: 9) that performance indicators should: 
• Be agreed jointly in advance between the manager and the individual as both 
realistic and challenging and, as such, they are ‘owned’ 
• Measure the actual level of achievement so that the basis on which 
performance is assessed can be clearly understood in advance. 
• Support the overall business strategies and values of the organisation so that 
the performance objectives taken together are mutually supportive and 
consistent throughout the organisation. 
 
The selection of which Key Performance Areas (KPAs) and Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) are to be used by the organisation is one of the most important 
strategic decisions that need to be made by the organisation.  This decision, and 
the relative weightings of such indicators will largely determine the short- and 
long-term strategic focus of the organisation, its management culture, and the 
performance information systems required (Bacal, 1999: 18-19). 
 
SAJEMS NS Vol 6 (2003) No 2 245 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY CONTEXT 
 
Chapter 7 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa  (RSA, 
1996) sets out the objectives and developmental duties of local government. 
 
Section 152 deals with the objectives of local government, as follows. 
 
 
OBJECTIVES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
152(1) The objectives of local government are: 
(a) to provide democratic and accountable government for local 
communities; 
(b) to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable 
manner; 
(c) to promote social and economic development; 
(d) to promote a safe and healthy environment;  and 
(e) to encourage the involvement of communities and community 
organisations in the matter of local government. 
 
152(2) A municipality must strive, within its financial and administrative 
capacity, to achieve the objectives set out in subsection (1). 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT DUTIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
153 A municipality must: 
(a) structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning 
processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community;  and 
(b) participate in national and provincial development programmes. 
 
The White Paper on Local Government (Department of Provincial Affairs and 
Constitutional Development, 1998) emphasised the impact which developmental 
local governments can have on the lives of typical South African communities 
such as: 
• provision of housing infrastructure and services 
• creation of liveable integrated cities, towns and rural areas 
• local economic development 
• community empowerment and resource redistribution. 
 
Amongst the ‘tools’ and ‘approaches’ for developmental local government, the 
White Paper identified significant changes required in the way local government 
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works in South Africa.  Three approaches were identified to assist municipalities 
to become more developmental and effective (p. 26), namely: 
• integrated development planning and budgeting 
• performance management 
• working together with local citizens and partners. 
 
Flowing out of the White Paper was the Local Government: Municipal Systems 
Act (RSA: 2000). This Act requires municipalities to establish a Performance 
Management system that is in line with the objectives, indicators and targets in 
its Integrated Development Plan to enable it to administer its affairs in an 
economical, effective, efficient and accountable manner. It needs to be noted 
that this legislation was not in place when the CTM introduced its PM system. 
However, the city was influenced by national thinking which was moving 
towards setting up a PM system. The CTM’s view was that it wanted to be the 
cutting edge of such PM reform. 
 
THE NEW CITY OF CAPE TOWN 1996-2000   
 
The move towards performance measurement  
 
After the Cape Metropolitan Area (CMA) local government ‘interim phase’ 
elections in 1996, the African National Congress (ANC) emerged as the 
governing party in the CTM.  The CTM was the best resourced of the seven 
councils (1 metropolitan council and 6 metropolitan local councils) within the 
CMA.  The National Party (NP) had won control of the other 5 metropolitan 
local councils and of the Cape Metropolitan Council in the greater Cape Town 
region (see Cameron, 1999).  The CTM was the only Metropolitan Local 
Council in the CMA to appoint its Chief Executive and all Executive Directors 
on performance-based contracts with the potential of performance bonuses, 
rather than on traditional permanent tenure appointments (Sewell, 2000: 113). 
 
The 1996 municipal election marked the end of racially segregated local 
government in South Africa.  In particular, it brought severely disadvantaged 
African areas under the control of formerly white local government structures.  
The CTM also faced the enormous challenge of the historical legacy of 
apartheid, characterised by unequal distribution of services.  In some areas of 
the City infrastructure and basic services were non-existent.  This included 
sanitation, water supply, electricity, street lighting and other infrastructure, as 
well as municipal amenities such as libraries, community halls and clinics.  
There was also a severe housing crisis, worsened by high levels of poverty and 
unemployment (City of Cape Town: 1999A: 3). 
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The CTM had defined its macro organisational design in terms of five executive 
directorates or departmental ‘clusters’:  corporate finances, municipal services, 
planning and economic development, community development and institutional 
transformation.  These five strategic executives would be led and co-ordinated 
by a Chief Executive, forming the Executive Management Team (EMT).  The 
Chief Executive and line Executive Directors were appointed on a five year 
performance based contract, while the Institutional Transformation Executive 
Director was appointed with a three year performance related contract, on the 
assumption that the transformation and organisation development goals would 
be achieved within a three year period. 
 
The new City Manager, and the Executive Directors (EDs) were appointed in 
early 1997 and by the middle of the year their contracts had been finalised, with 
fairly broad performance related objectives and a commitment to annual 
performance review and reward.  These broad objectives were to strive to ensure 
that Cape Town becomes: 
• a leading city of the world 
• a prosperous city with a thriving economy 
• an integrated city, with equal access to facilities and opportunities 
• a harmonious, safe, orderly and secure city with an attractive natural and 
built environment 
• a city in which all of its peoples are able to ensure an optimum quality of life 
(Sewell, 2000: 113-6). 
 
The performance contracts also had more specific objectives.  For example, the 
ED for Planning and Economic Developments Director’s contract stated that he 
had to: 
• plan and ensure the implementation of the City of Cape Town’s economic 
development strategy; 
• plan and ensure the implementation of spatial integration and the 
management of urbanisation strategies; 
• plan and ensure the implementation of strategies for the integrated 
management of built environments; 
• build and promote the effective use of coalitions for growth and 
development, through facilitating the establishment of community networks 
and public-private sector partnerships which facilitate the achievement of the 
city’s strategies, programmes and budgets; 
• on an ongoing basis to review, monitor and appraise progress and 
performance in achieving the fulfilment of agreed plans and budgets and 
taking appropriate corrective action; 
• participate in the activities of the executive management team and such other 
teams as convened from time to time, to conceptualise, plan, integrate, co-
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ordinate, implement and monitor corporate policies and strategies (Sewell, 
2000: 116). 
 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
 
The CTM commissioned a comprehensive international study of successes and 
failures in public sector and parastatal performance management programmes.  
A complete analysis of the international lessons learned survey by the CTM is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  What was deduced was that the following 
components were necessary for an effective and sustainable public sector PM 
normative framework: 
• meaningful consultation with community stakeholders in defining priority 
outcomes and in agreeing performance objectives or indicators 
• clear definition of ‘customer’ related outputs and outcomes, which the 
institution can realistically measure and achieve, within its resources 
• visible political and management commitment and pro-active leadership of 
the PM process 
• clear linkages between the organisational performance objectives and 
individual performance indicators of the appropriate political, strategic and 
operational management levels 
• a developmental, rather than a punitive approach 
• credible achievement measurement criteria 
• accurate, timeous performance evaluation data and feedback 
• prompt and commensurate consequences, whether positive or negative 
• simplicity and flexibility in operation, yet with consistency in measurement 
standards and consequences. 
 
 
INITIATION OF THE PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
While there had been a thorough international review of comparative best 
practice of performance management systems, the implementation thereof in the 
CTM turned out to be rather problematic. As pointed out, the CTM had 
introduced a PM system before there was any national framework. While local 
experimentations are not necessarily a problem, the absence of a national 
framework did in fact mean that the introduction of the Cape Town PM system 
was a process of trial and experimentation which contributed to some crucial 
errors that were made, in the “interim” transformation period of local 
government, 1996-2000. 
 
Throughout this period, the pressure and confusion of the ongoing transfer of 
staff, files, equipment and premises to and from the new CTM and the other 
newly constituted municipalities made the effective marshalling of resources to 
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begin implementing any specific vision or PM system a near impossibility 
(Interview with CTM Exco Chairperson, July 1997 and Sewell, 2000). 
This lack of focus on PM was reflected in the media reports on the first 
performance review, carried out in 1998.  The EDs and City Manager were 
evaluated by the CTM Executive Committee (Exco) on their personal 
performance and the effective operation of their departments.  The City Manager 
is said to have exceeded expectations, receiving a 85 per cent rating from Exco.  
Other EDs ratings were 85 per cent, 65 per cent and 70 per cent although the ED 
for Planning and Economic Development was given a performance rating of 
only 55 per cent.  The latter ED challenged this, saying that the process was 
flawed:  his department did not have the necessary resources and did not have 
enough support in dealing with a ‘difficult’ public.  After taking legal advice, 
Exco retracted, publishing a public apology in the local press, acknowledging 
that the process of performance evaluation was incomplete and a number of 
serious objections were being considered.  Exco stated that while it was fully 
committed to evaluations of the performance of staff to ensure delivery, it had 
unanimously decided to declare this particular process null and void. 
 
It appeared that Exco had adopted a subjective set of impressions of 
achievement, rather than using objective agreed performance criteria indicators.  
This was a significant setback for the embryonic PM approach and as a result, 
no performance bonuses were paid to City EMT members for 1997/98 (Sewell, 
2000:  122-3). 
 
The CTM then returned to the drawing board and began working on a 
comprehensive performance management system.  Each of the 16 directorates 
were required for the first time to draw up operational business plans within the 
agreed budget, with performance related objectives and performance indicators.  
Exco also decided to put in place a review process which would entail 
monitoring and evaluating corporate performance on business plans by means of 
regular performance review, moving as soon as practical to an individual 
director level. This review process was necessary in order to track the 
performance results of individual directors and managers within the framework 
of their organisational business plans (Sewell, 2000: 124-7). 
 
The PM programme was ready to be launched and the tender for external 
consultants to facilitate the process was awarded to IBM’s consulting division; 
which then seconded a consultant to head the CTM’s Transformation staff.  As 
the former ED for Institutional Transformation had departed, a project team 
consisting of senior politicians and officials was set up to lead the performance 
management project. 
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Deadline dates were agreed, with a view to gaining Exco approval for the 
framework of a performance management programme by March 1999.  
However, the PM project plan soon began to show cracks.  Firstly, the ED for 
Institutional Transformation had resigned and a former ANC councillor (in fact 
the former ‘political sponsor’ of the PM project) was appointed to the post.  This 
had a number of adverse effects.  Firstly, the new ED was seen by several 
officials as a political appointment to promote governing party policy and 
accordingly did not get management buy-in for the PM process.  Secondly, the 
Human Resources Department (HRD) and Organisation Development and 
Transformation (OD&T) Department, formerly co-ordinated by the departed 
ED, began operating autonomously, and strategy and personality differences 
began to emerge, negatively influencing coherent PM implementation.  Thirdly, 
the corporate relationship with IBM consultants began to sour, apparently 
because of their perceived distance from the practical needs of the Council in 
moving the project forward.  Fourthly, the level of commitment and ownership 
required from the Executive Management Team was not always top of their 
priority list. This was possibly because of the disputed performance rating of the 
ED which was leaked to the press, and resulted in considerable embarrassment 
for Exco and non-payment of any bonuses to all the EMT members.  
Furthermore, 2 EDs who had previously been on the permanent staff of the 
former Cape Town City Council had refused to sign their new performance 
contracts until they received a written assurance that they would not be 
financially disadvantaged in terms of their length of service and the benefits to 
which they were entitled.  This was only resolved in 2001.  A key element of 
best practice, namely line management accountability and “ownership” of the 
PM process, was accordingly absent. 
 
This was reflected in an audit of performance management attitudes within the 
City where only 11 out of 63 Directors and Branch Managers indicated that they 
would support the introduction of a formalised corporate performance 
monitoring system (Sewell, 2000: 127-30). 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT THRUST 
 
The increasing thrust for a performance management approach developed from 
the seven strategic political objectives adopted by the Cape Town City Council 
in 1998, widely publicised as the “Commitment to Cape Town” (Sewell, 2000: 
118-20): 
• a framework for the integration of the City: “a common vision for a divided 
city” 
• equity and redistribution: “a commitment to fairness for all” 
• poverty and social disintegration: “helping areas most in need” 
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• housing and homelessness: “new solutions for public housing projects” 
• economic development and job creation: “working for growth and 
opportunity” 
• promoting community safety: “teaming up to fight crime” 
• special high impact projects: “from planning to action” 
 
This “Commitment to Cape Town” document was adopted by Council as a 
corporate business plan, emphasising that the seven strategic priorities must be 
integrated into a coherent plan, driven by three management strategies: 
• a financial strategy: including new budgeting and reporting processes 
• a transformation strategy: including human resource development, 
performance management and change management; 
• a communications strategy: aimed at internal and external stakeholders. 
 
In her budget speech for the “People’s Budget” of 1998/1999, the Exco 
Chairperson emphasised that the integrated development planning process for 
the City of Cape Town was developed within this framework of seven strategic 
priorities, and pointed out that because of the reduced subsidies from national 
and provincial government, capital expenditure had to be budgeted at an overall 
reduction of 10.9 per cent compared with the previous year, and also that 
Council’s personnel budget was under severe pressure.  The overall tone of the 
budget speech underlined the determination of Exco to “do more with less”, 
challenging councillors and management to focus their resources, energies and 
skills on the services and projects that would deliver most effective and 
sustainable results, within the framework of the seven strategic objectives.  Each 
of the 16 directorates was required to draw up operational business plans within 
their agreed budgets; with performance objectives and performance indicators 
for each objective.  This was a significant move in the direction of creating a 
framework for the performance management approach within Council’s 
organisation, because “performance indicators” had seldom been part of the 
culture of any Council department in past years.  A “strategic scorecard” for 
Council, Exco and EMT agendas, was adopted – based on the Balanced 
Scorecard approach1.  Most significantly, in terms of the launching of a formal 
performance management programme within CTM, was the Exco decision to 
put in place a regular performance review process.  This would monitor and 
evaluate corporate performance on the business plans by means of regular 
performance reviews at Executive Management Team level … moving “as soon 
as possible” to an individual management level, in order to track the 
contributions of individual directors and managers within the framework of their 
business plans. 
 
Now came the creation of a powerful and innovative aspect of the CTM 
business planning and performance improvement process: the concept of 
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identifying mission – critical Business Plan Highlights (BPH) in each of the 
business plans, which were politically and operationally vital and which could 
be resourced and motivated by a “carrot and stick method”.  In implementing the 
1999/2000 budgets, the focus on key result areas was underscored by reducing 
all operational budgets by 5 per cent, thus creating a pool of funding which 
could be used as an extra incentive to directors and branch managers who 
performed “on track” with their Business Plan Highlights quarterly, and would 
then be allocated additional funding based on their demonstrated ability to 
perform.  Although the total value of the 17 business plan highlights was less 
than 20 per cent of Council’s operational budget, this was regarded as an 
acceptable proportion in keeping with the Pareto or 80/20 principle, familiar to 
many effective business managers who manage the 20 per cent key deliverables 
within their businesses, in order to achieve the 80 per cent most significant 
results.  During the ensuring financial year, the system of focussing on and 
resourcing business plan highlight achievements proved successful and 
motivational at EMT and Director level: during a subsequent performance audit, 
several directors made comments such as “business plan highlighting is a master 
stroke – it has broken us away from the old incremental budgeting”; and “it’s a 
hell of an improvement; we are now much more focused and we ask many more 
questions about cost, service standards and deadlines”.  The increased paper 
work and centralised controls inherent in the CTM system, however, caused 
some resentment from middle management: “we are gatvol (fed up); we spend 
too much time regurgitating information … we are being paralysed by paper and 
process … and it stops us from getting on with our work”. 
 
 
1999-2000: NEW BUDGET BENCHMARKS AND ACCELERATED 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
 
As Cape Town’s 1999/2000 Budget was prepared and presented, the seven 
strategic objectives were clearly defined again as the Council’s agenda for 
equitable service delivery and integrated development.  Further valuable 
performance-related research was commissioned in order to provide a more 
solid basis for understanding community needs and defining performance 
indicators in the strategic areas, including (Sewell, 2000: 132-6): 
• a 100 page comprehensive and definitive report on “poverty indicators” and 
the 7 strategic priorities of the City of Cape Town (Isandla Institute, 1999) 
• an extensive Residents Satisfaction Study (Nielsen, 1999) which highlighted 
opinions from civic, community and business organisations throughout the 
City in terms of their classification of services as “essential”, “necessary”, 
and “nice to have”.  The Satisfaction Study also enabled community 
stakeholders to rate Council communications, customer service standards and 
citizens’ willingness to pay for improved services. 
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Using this data, the Business Plan Highlights were redefined in several cases, 
and the CTM’s Human Resource Management Department was able to begin a 
skills audit with a view to preparing a comprehensive document entitled 
“Business Plan Highlights – Training Strategies”, incorporating a skills 
development plan process linked to Council’s employment equity plan to redress 
former apartheid job discrimination.  A major project was launched to focus on 
the core competencies required by Council management and key staff, as a 
possible basis for equitable selection, internal promotion and staff development 
programmes. 
 
As the year 2000 progressed, however, increasing political pressure (doubtless 
in the light of the looming municipal elections) was evident; and the City 
Manager commissioned an independent performance audit team to verify the 
latest business plan highlights and capital project reports submitted in January 
2000, so that the EMT and Exco could be assured that valid performance 
measurement information was in fact flowing through to them.  The report of the 
independent performance audit, however, was not at all reassuring to EMT and 
Exco leadership; neither in terms of the verification of figures and key 
performance area objectives, nor in terms of the achievement of required 
performance indicators for the various business plan highlights and capital 
programmes.  The main findings of the performance audit to EMT were as 
follows: 
• business plan expenditure and projected results were “suspect”, as 
approximately 95 per cent of the sample of branches audited indicated that 
100 per cent of their budgets would be spent by year end, despite an average 
of only 15 per cent actual expenditure reflected for the six month period 
under review.  “It was highly unlikely, therefore, that such a large backlog 
could be recovered in the second six months of the financial year”. 
• the Business Plan Highlight Scorecards were not always completed in a 
standardised manner and “the expenditure reflected and projections made 
could therefore not be used as an effective performance measuring tool for 
future decision making” 
• with regard to the specific performance indicators on the various Business 
Plan Highlights, the review form given to directors and managers did not ask 
for any indicator information, and so “it was therefore not possible to verify 
their achievement or otherwise”. 
 
As a direct consequence of this performance audit report, the processes of 
monitoring, tracking and reviewing the organisational performance indicators 
had to be further refined and simplified, seeking to achieve the full benefits of 
the performance management thrust; and also to maintain an acceptable level of 
credibility, motivation and implementation by directors and managers. 
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The Exco Chairperson made a telling point in his remarks to a subsequent 
Exco/EMT bosberaad (strategic review workshop) that unlike politicians, who 
will “soon undergo the ultimate performance audit – an election”, senior 
management in the CTM had not yet had their performance appraised.  
Ironically, he did not reflect that this was in fact the employer’s responsibility in 
terms of the EMT contracts.  Flowing from this bosberaad, a further refinement 
to the Business Plan Highlights was prepared for the coming year, and revised 
performance indicators and objectives were set for the preparation of the 
2000/2001 Council Budget.  Decisions were also made to prepare performance 
reviews for the City Manager and each Executive Director; and to prepare 
practical training sessions for all Branch Managers in the philosophy and 
practical application of performance management for implementation in their 
branches.  This planned roll out during 2000 was destined not to happen, 
however – for a combination of reasons, as it later emerged in the study: 
increasing pre-election pressure to deliver left little time for reviewing results 
and training middle management in the essential interactive skills of 
performance improvement in their branches; and a growing reluctance to discuss 
actual achievements was evident, in the light of the fact that few specific 
performance objectives had actually been agreed between Exco and EMT 
members, against which they could equitably be assessed.  Given that the two 
EDs formerly on permanent staff had still not signed their 1997 performance 
agreements, it was apparently decided not to pursue the performance reviews, 
and the process of assessing actual performance, reviewing skills development 
needs and resource deployment ultimately took second place to the public 
promotion of Council achievements, as the Unicity election programme began to 
take centre stage in the minds of politicians and professional managers alike.  As 
one of the EDs put it: “Why should I expose myself to a performance review at 
this stage?  With elections just around the corner, and the possibility of a new 
Council employer – that could be a career limiting event!”  
 
 
EVALUATION OF CTM’s PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 
How effectively and efficiently did the CTM initiate and implement its 
performance management system?  This analysis is based on the perusal of 
primary documents and a set of qualitative interviews held with senior CTM 
officials and managers.  
 
1. How clearly were the political-administrative vision and values of the 
Cape Town Municipality formulated and developed? 
 
On the balance of the evidence it can be suggested that the CTM’s political 
vision, core values and strategic priorities were carefully formulated, 
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consistently communicated to the stakeholders and reviewed regularly with 
senior management and communities as the basis of Cape Town’s public 
commitment to performance. 
 
2. How was the achievement of strategic performance objectives 
facilitated through management effectiveness and efficiency? 
 
Possibly because of their inexperience in the design and implementation of 
performance management processes, political leadership and executive 
management did not adequately build in fundamental PM processes.  They 
allowed a very complex set of organisational performance indicators, framework 
and centralised reviews to be brought into being which led to long EMT and 
EXCO meetings, some of which time could have been used more productively 
in devolving accountability to, and developing operational PM skills at director 
and branch manager levels. 
 
The CTM’s political/administrative management was neither optimally effective 
nor efficient in achieving its planned strategic implementation of transformation 
and performance management objectives.  Indications of why there was 
underachievement are discussed hereunder. 
 
3. How effectively was a normative framework of international best 
practice implemented by Cape Town? 
 
Within the framework of international best practice research, and the 
components identified by several Exco and EMT performance improvement 
workshops, the following conclusions can be reached on how effectively the 
CTM implemented its stated PM approach: 
 
(i) Meaningful consultation with community stakeholders in defining priority 
outcomes and in agreeing performance objectives and indicators.  
There was generally much consultation and ongoing annual public 
information campaigns, including pre-budget consultation meetings which 
were held on a large scale as part of the ‘Commitment to Cape Town’ 
theme of the PM programme.  Civic organisations indicated that the flow 
of information generated was unprecedented and provided much 
meaningful feedback to Council’s Exco and EMT for performance 
planning and review.  The data does, however, suggest that municipal 
trade unions were seldom consulted for their inputs on performance 
priorities and indicators. 
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(ii) Clear definition of ‘customer-related’ outputs and outcomes which the 
institution can realistically measure and achieve, within its resources. 
This component was generally positive.  For example, the 2000/2001 
Business Plan Manual (City Council of Cape Town, 1999B) for the first 
time defined departmental outputs and medium-term outcomes for almost 
every Council function, not always readily measurable at the time, but 
indicating the future information database necessary for measurement. 
 
(iii) Visible political and management commitment and pro-active leadership 
of the PM process. 
Exco and EMT commitment to the PM process was evident from the 
conceptual origins of the PM programme in early 1997, when the new 
EMT was appointed on the basis of broad performance competencies and 
contractual criteria.  The pro-active EMT management leadership lost 
momentum from late 1998, however, after the public retraction of ED 
performance reviews, which had still not been systematically undertaken 
by 2000.  This lack of meaningful consequences of performance, and the 
reluctance of two EDs to sign their performance contracts until the 
resolution of their questions regarding their former service conditions, 
undoubtedly diminished ‘ownership’, motivation and commitment of 
senior management to the PM process and products. 
 
(iv) Clear linkages between the organisational performance objectives and 
individual performance indicators at the appropriate political, strategic 
and operational management level. 
One major shortcoming was that no direct linkage was established 
between Cape Town’s institutional and individual performance 
agreements, below ED level.  The ED individual “performance 
scorecards” were not consummated after the October 1998 objections and 
apology; and were not further implemented, pending resolution of legal 
queries on two ED performance contracts.  The process of developing a 
“performance management culture” was not extended to the next levels of 
management, by re-focussing their job descriptions on outputs linked to 
the organisational business plans. 
 
(v) A developmental rather than a punitive approach 
The conceptual process of effective PM encourages continuous 
performance feedback, improvement and development.  Observations, 
however, showed that senior CTM managers had a punitive culture i.e. ‘to 
performance manage’ was typically understood to connote ‘taking 
disciplinary or punitive action’, rather than coaching, developing or 
supporting performance improvement. 
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(vi) Credible, achievable measurement criteria 
The issue of identifying and effectively using credible performance 
indicators or management criteria for Council’s strategic priority 
outcomes and business plan objectives proved to be difficult.  Firstly, the 
CTM strategic priorities related largely to long-term outcomes which 
were measured through specifically commissioned surveys and national 
census data, which was not necessarily available by local municipal areas.  
Secondly, the lack of previous experience in defining performance 
indicators and negotiating realistic targets for Council’s wide range of 
services led to many hours of heated debates at political and managerial 
workshops, regarding the relevance, validity and achievability of 
alternative performance criteria. 
 
A further concern was that the 17 Business Plan Highlights which 
together with the Capital Development Projects, formed the main PM 
thrust for Cape Town, represented only 20 per cent of total City 
expenditure and did not involve all branches in the PM process. 
 
(vii) Accurate, timeous performance evaluation data and feedback 
One of the most essential components of the PM conceptual model is the 
existence and use of accurate and timeous evaluation data, so that 
recognition, reinforcement or corrective action can contribute to 
performance management.  This component was not often evident in Cape 
Town’s pioneering PM programme.  Probably, the most serious gap was 
the archaic financial reporting system, which was never less than two 
months in arrears, thus making prompt reaction to financial performance 
data out of the question. 
 
(viii) Prompt, commensurate consequences, whether positive or negative 
The lack of meaningful consequences to reinforce team or individual 
achievement and behaviour was recognised by most officials interviewed 
as a serious shortcoming in the Cape Town PM pilot process. 
 
For example, at EMT level, the Exco failure to resolve disputes regarding 
the two EDs’ performance contracts and to implement individual ED 
performance contracts, meant that there were no performance bonuses 
paid out in terms of their contracts to the City Manager and the EDs.  This 
was described by these senior officials as a very demotivating situation, 
given that they had foregone the usual guaranteed thirteenth cheque 
‘bonus’ in accepting the challenge of a fixed-period performance-based 
contract (Sewell, 2000: 188-204). 
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There was a serious lack of co-ordination, co-operation and trust between 
the HRD and the OD&T departments.  This led to significant 
dysfunctionality and lack of effective integration between the desired 
thrust of  PM, and the existing personnel management processes which 
needed to be linked in to PM, several of which (such as job descriptions, 
competence definitions, skills development, career management, 
recruitment and selection and employment equity) were located in the 
Human Resource function (Sewell, 2000: 188-206). 
 
(ix) Simplicity and flexibility in operation, yet with consistency in 
measurement standards and consequences. 
Central to the CTM performance management programme was a series of 
corporately identified business improvement projects, aimed at 
simplifying and streamlining customer service and administrative 
efficiency.  All senior management respondents interviewed (May/June 
2000) who had been involved in identifying and implementing these 
projects, confirmed their value in terms of saving time, money and 
facilitating improved staff motivation and service delivery levels. 
 
Almost all of these senior officials, however, commented on the perceived 
complexity of the organisational PM tracking and review processes, 
indicating a high level of frustration with the ‘huge volume of paper 
produced by the planning and reporting’ and the ‘chopping and changing 
of objectives and systems’. 
 
(4) What was the impact of political and union attitudes and actions on 
performance management principles and practice? 
 
Proactive political leadership from Exco was always a positive factor in the 
direction of the CTM organisational performance management.  Exco worked 
closely with the Executive Management Team in promoting the Cape Town 
mission, vision and seven strategic priorities. 
 
The political-administrative interactions of the CTM Standing Committees, 
however, were not similarly proactive or productive.  The perception was 
expressed by several senior managers and union leaders that a ‘punitive 
approach’ was too frequently observed in the interactions between politicians 
and management.  The phrase ‘we must performance manage him’ was heard at 
various meetings with the connotation of disciplining or taking strong corrective 
action against an unco-operative staff member. 
 
Several senior managers also expressed concern at the blurring of the political-
administrative roles through the appointment of a former politician as the project 
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leader in charge of performance management.  Several directors and managers 
found this blurring to be problematic, because the person concerned was 
perceived to be participating actively in political caucuses, influencing the 
opinions of politicians about officials’ performance, competence and 
commitment. 
 
Union support for the performance management process (as reflected in 
interviews in May/June 2000, towards the end of the research period) was at best 
lukewarm; confined to broad support for organisational goal setting and 
productivity improvement, but firmly against translating organisational 
objectives into ‘subjective’ measurable individual accountability, which might 
affect union members’ career scope. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the following conclusions can be made 
regarding the processes adopted by the Cape Town Municipality to implement 
their PM system from 1996 until 2000. 
 
• The performance management concepts, approaches and tools used by the 
CTM were politically and theoretically appropriate at organisational level, 
though not effectively operationalised to achieve real management 
ownership, accountability, motivation and commitment. 
• The development of the City’s vision, mission and strategic priorities as a 
platform for integrated development planning was done with considerable 
community consultation by political leadership and executive management.  
A high level of awareness of these strategic priorities was achieved, certainly 
at senior management level and possibly amongst the majority of the Council 
managerial staff.  It refocused the energies and resource allocation of CTM 
management on defined outputs and outcomes, rather than on mere 
administrative effort. 
• The planned cascading of performance indicators from organisational 
business plans to team and individual managers accountable for performance 
outputs did not happen.  It is likely that little more will be done at individual 
PM level until the specifics of the process are agreed with the trade unions. 
• CTM political Exco and EMT officials have initiated and participated in 
community and sectoral progress reviews with a range of stakeholder groups. 
• It is difficult to assess accurately (without comprehensive staff attitude 
surveys) whether the CTM organisational culture has become more 
performance-aware or results-driven from branch manager level down.  
Although the focus on BPHs and capital projects has contributed to a higher 
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level of performance awareness and accountability for results, this is only 
evident in these branches where these PM processes were implemented. 
• Without clear definition of relevant, measurable indicators and benchmarks 
to monitor and motivate performance, no municipal PM approach can 
achieve the desired sustainable results.  A great deal of thorough research and 
experienced thought at organisation level went into the selection of  KPIs for 
the BPHs.  A significant problem was that the archaic municipal information 
systems did not facilitate timeous, accurate reporting on many of these 
performance indicators.  This was mitigated by the fact that several senior 
managers instituted their own manual KPI information monitoring and 
reporting systems.  This made meaningful follow-up, diagnosis and 
corrective action possible in those branches. 
• Acceptable methods have yet to be worked out for the conversion of 
permanent career appointments to fixed-period performance-based contracts; 
as shown by the legal complexity of the non-resolution of two Cape Town 
EDs’ unsigned contracts.  Non-payment of ED performance bonuses and lack 
of agreed specific performance criteria and consequences by the Council as 
employer unfortunately became a disincentive; and led to diminished 
management support for the effective implementation of performance 
management, despite all the enthusiasm and drive of political leadership in 
the City Council.  
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1 The Balance Scorecard is a performance measurement approach which 
enables organisations to define their strategic focus in terms of four key 
“perspectives”, (or “strategic themes”) which need to be “balanced” for 
sustainable performance, namely:  financial, customer, internal business 
processes and staff learning and growth perspectives. The alignment of 
organisational with individual scorecard objectives, and identification of 
linkages between various functions or departments, are essential for the 
balanced allocation of resources and co-ordination of potentially 
conflicting strategies, in a complex organisation. 
2 Initially designed for application to the for-profit (private) sector, where 
the emphasis on financial profitability objectives is paramount, the 
authors subsequently developed a modified version of the Balanced 
Scorecard tool for not-for-profit and public sector organisations, notably 
pioneered by the City of Charlotte, USA (Kaplan, 1999). 
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